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The Unauthorized Practice of Law, the NCAA, and Athletic Compliance Directors
I.	INTRODUCTION

An investigation by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) for
athletics rules violations at colleges and universities can set off a firestorm of negative
attention from the media and alumni alike.1 Scandals involving football or basketball
programs cost coaches and administrators their jobs, athletes their amateur eligibility,
and colleges millions of dollars.2 The collegiate athletic compliance director plays an
important role in preventing such nightmares because he is charged with ensuring
that athletes, staff, and coaches are following NCAA rules. 3 But meanwhile, who is
regulating the compliance director?
This note will argue that non-attorney athletic compliance directors are violating
state statutes that criminalize the unauthorized practice of law (“UPL”) because their
jobs involve interpreting law and advising clients about the legal consequences of
their actions. This note will further argue that state UPL statutes should be rewritten
to include compliance directors’ activities as the practice of law. The legal profession
maintains a monopoly over legal services by regulating who is allowed to practice law
and by defining what activities “practicing law” includes.4 Lay-people who engage in
such activities and attorneys who engage in prohibited activities are in violation of
UPL statutes and are subject to prosecution.5 However, at the same time that the
legal profession regulates and prosecutes violations of UPL statutes, it has ignored an
entire industry that provides legal services and is virtually unregulated. Collegiate
athletic compliance directors interpret statutes and contracts and give legal advice on
a daily basis, yet they are often non-lawyers, and are allowed to operate entirely
unregulated by the American Bar Association (“ABA”) or local bar associations.
Part II of this note will discuss the history of UPL, as well as the history of the
NCAA and its emphasis on regulating conduct. Part III will discuss the lack of
legislation and regulation of athletic compliance directors and illustrate why this is
problematic. Part IV will propose a solution to the lack of regulation—specifically,
that New York UPL statutes should be amended to prevent non-lawyers from giving
legal advice while working as athletic compliance directors. Part V concludes this
note.

1.

Gene Marsh & Marie Robbins, Weighing the Interests of the Institution, the Membership and Institutional
Representatives in an NCAA Investigation, 55 Fla. L. Rev. 667, 669 (2003).

2.

See Kevin E. Broyles, NCAA Regulation of Intercollegiate Athletics: Time for a New Game Plan, 46 Ala. L.
Rev. 487, 528–44 (1995).

3.

See generally Greg Heller, Preparing for the Storm: The Representation of a University Accused of Violating
NCAA Regulations, 7 Marq. Sports L.J. 295 (1996).

4.

Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical
Parameters, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2581, 2581–82 (1999).

5.

See, e.g., People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 338–39 (1919); In re Perez, 327 B.R. 94, 96–97 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2005).
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II.	HISTORY

A. Regulation to Promote Competency and Accountability

“In early America, attorneys did not dominate the legal system to the extent that
they do today.”6 The development of an organized bar association was sporadic until
the early twentieth century.7 In the past century, lawyers in America have worked
hard to centralize and maintain control over the legal profession.8 Lawyers pride
themselves not merely on working in a business or industry, but rather on being
members of a profession. Several characteristics distinguish a profession from a
business: a requirement of extensive formal training, admission to practice by
licensure, a code of ethics imposing standards of conduct, a system of discipline for
member violations, a duty to subordinate financial rewards to social responsibility,
and an obligation by its members to conduct themselves honorably.9 Because law is a
profession, non-lawyers are barred from performing legal services, including giving
legal advice.10
Attorneys centralized and organized the legal profession in order to protect
consumers of legal services.11 This was accomplished by instituting strict educational
requirements for admission to a bar association instead of traditional apprenticeships.12
A non-lawyer who provides certain legal services is subject to punishment under UPL
statutes. These legal services can include: (1) representing a person in a judicial or
administrative capacity, (2) preparing legal instruments or documents, and (3) advising
one of his legal rights and responsibilities.13 Lawyers assert that UPL statutes are
necessary to ensure that clients receive competent and professional judgment from
individuals with an ethical commitment to act properly.14 In contrast, non-lawyers
performing those tasks are not necessarily trained or educated in the law, have not
been licensed by a bar association, and are not governed by rules of conduct.15
6.

Sande L. Buhai, Act Like a Lawyer, Be Judged Like a Lawyer: The Standard of Care for the Unlicensed
Practice of Law, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 87, 92 (2007).

7.

Id.

8.

Denckla, supra note 4, at 2582. “Although courts ultimately enforce the regulation of the practice of law,
bar associations have largely set the agenda for its regulation.” Id.

9.

Richard A. Glaser & Leslee M. Lewis, Redefining the Professional: The Policies and Unregulated
Development of Consultant Malpractice Liability, 72 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 563, 575 (1995).

10.

Denckla, supra note 4, at 2581.

11.

See Buhai, supra note 6, at 91–93.

12.

See Mark J. Osiel, Lawyers as Monopolists, Aristocrats, and Entrepreneurs, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 2009, 2023
(1990) (reviewing Lawyers in Society (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C. Lewis eds., 1988–1989)).

13.

See Buhai, supra note 6, at 94.

14.

See Linda Galler, Problems in Defining and Controlling the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 44 Ariz. L.
Rev. 773, 779 (2002).

15.

Denckla, supra note 4, at 2593. Ethical Consideration 3-1 of the Model Code “explains that ‘the
prohibition against the practice of law by a layman is grounded in the need of the public for integrity
and competence of those who undertake to render legal services.’” Id.
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In recent years, non-lawyers have threatened the lawyer monopoly as they began
performing in areas that had traditionally been considered legal areas, such as
corporate compliance, information-technology consulting, employmentdiscrimination consulting, and environmental enforcement.16 In addition, today, real
estate agents and brokers, title companies, sports agents, and accountants all provide
assistance and advice on legal matters.17 From the legal profession’s point of view,
this is problematic because those individuals are arguably providing legal services but
are not held to the same standard of care as licensed lawyers, who are required to act
with a “degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and
exercised by a reasonable, careful, and prudent lawyer in the practice of law in his
jurisdiction.”18 Furthermore, non-lawyers are not subject to regulation by the ABA
or local bar associations.19
In addition to non-lawyers engaging in UPL, the legal profession is concerned
about the emergence of multidisciplinary practices, in which lawyers work in
partnership with non-lawyers. 20 Under ABA Model Rule 5.4, lawyers are not
permitted to share legal fees or ownership and control of a firm with non-lawyers.21
This often occurs in the context of accounting firms that employ lawyers, accountants,
and others in one firm.22 Although a multidisciplinary practice is often attractive to
clients because it provides a convenient place to get all needed services, lawyers are
concerned with regulating that conduct in order to ensure competency in the practice
of law.23

16.

See generally Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of “Law Consultants,” 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1397 (2006).

17.

Buhai, supra note 6, at 93–94. “In the interests of cost and efficiency, consumers are often willing to
forego the additional costs of an attorney and allow the businesses that are already handling the nonlegal aspects of their transactions to assist them with related legal questions.” Id. at 94.

18.

Id. at 93 (quoting Walker v. Bangs, 601 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Wash. 1979)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

19.

See Denckla, supra note 4, at 2581.

20. Galler, supra note 14, at 774–75.
21.

Id. at 775. This rule states, in relevant part, that “[a] lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a
nonlawyer,” with a few exceptions, and “[a] lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any
of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.
5.4 (a), (b) (2004).

22.

Galler, supra note 14, at 777–78.

23.

Id. at 775. In some instances, courts have found that there is little threat to the public to have nonlawyers performing certain tasks, such as preparing real estate contracts or conducting real estate
closings. Id. at 780. A multidisciplinary practice (MDP) is a firm that provides both legal and non-legal
services, and where lawyers and non-lawyers share legal fees and clients. Id. at 773. It has been argued
that lawyers are concerned that the growth of MDPs and the compliance profession threaten their
monopoly on certain types of legal work. See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 53 (1981).
It has also been argued that lawyers are less concerned with protecting the public and more concerned
with maintaining tight control over the profession for pecuniary reasons. See id. at 51–53.
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Some states have considered redefining the practice of law in the state in order to
both protect the public and allow non-lawyers to perform some arguably legal work.24
Advocates for maintaining tight control of the profession argue that a broad definition
of the practice of law is necessary to provide a useful regulatory framework, while nonlawyers who wish to engage in certain work want a narrow definition so that their
work is excluded and they are not guilty of engaging in UPL.25 Washington and Texas
recently attempted to reconcile the interests of the bar association on the one hand,
and non-legal professionals and clients not wishing to hire lawyers on the other.26 The
laws in those states define the practice of law broadly, and then specify those
professionals, other than lawyers, that are permitted “to engage in specific conduct that
falls within the practice of law and the circumstances under which they may do so.”27
However, this model of redefinition has not been followed in the majority of states, so
non-lawyers, including athletic compliance officers, regularly violate UPL statutes.
B. History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) is the organization
through which the majority of United States colleges and universities compete in
athletics. 28 “[I]t is a voluntary unincorporated association of members who have
adopted a constitution and bylaws that specify the agreements among the members”
and operating rules.29 Universities formed what is now known as the NCAA in the
early twentieth century because of the need to regulate football.30 With no governing
body or enforcement system, the sport was extremely violent and the unregulated style
of play had frequently resulted in serious injuries and deaths.31 As a result, many schools
were discontinuing their programs and wanted to abolish football.32 Then, in 1905,
President Theodore Roosevelt held a conference with athletics leaders and formed the
Intercollegiate Athletic Association with sixty-two members.33 The members agreed
to follow certain principles and regulations when conducting their individual athletic
programs.34 In 1910, the organization’s name was changed to the NCAA.35
24.

See Galler, supra note 14, at 782–84 (providing Washington and Texas as examples).

25.

See id. at 782–84.

26. Id. at 783.
27.

Id.

28. See Heller, supra note 3, at 299.
29. John Kitchin, The NCAA and Due Process, 5 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 71, 71 (1996).
30. Heller, supra note 3, at 298. The NCAA was founded in 1906 as the Intercollegiate Athletic Association

of the United States. Id.

31.

Kitchin, supra note 29.

32.

Id.

33.

Id.

34. Id.
35.

Id.
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Currently, the NCAA has approximately 1000 active members, comprised of
colleges and universities in each state.36 Members can choose to compete in one of
three divisions: Division I—which is the most competitive, Division II, or Division
III. 37 The member schools are required to adopt the NCAA legislation, which
governs the conduct of the athletic programs.38 A forty-six-member council, elected
by member schools at the annual convention, oversees NCAA policy in between
conventions. 39 In addition, there are multiple committees established during the
convention that develop policy by issuing reports to the council.40 In order to serve
on the council or a committee, an individual must be on the staff of a member college,
university, or conference.41
The NCAA established several purposes of their organization, including
improving intercollegiate athletic programs for student-athletes, upholding the
principles of institutional control of all intercollegiate sports in conformity with the
NCAA’s constitution and bylaws, and supervising the conduct of, and establishing
eligibility standards for, regional and national athletics events run by the Association.42
In addition, the NCAA constitution sets forth the NCAA’s fundamental policy with
regard to obligations of member institutions:
Legislation governing the conduct of intercollegiate athletics programs of
member institutions shall apply to basic athletics issues such as admissions,
financial aid, eligibility and recruiting. Member institutions shall be obligated
to apply and enforce this legislation, and the enforcement procedures of the
Association shall be applied to an institution when it fails to fulfill this
obligation.43

The enforcement procedures of NCAA rules differ from those of civil or criminal
litigation because they do not, at least in theory, involve an adversarial system.44
36. Heller, supra note 3, at 299. “In 1950, there were approximately 350 schools and 12 conferences active in

the NCAA. Today, there are 1000 schools and 110 conferences active within the Association.” Id.

37.

See NCAA Eligibility Center, 2008–09 Guide for the College-Bound Student-Athlete 2–5,
http://www.ncaapublications.com/Uploads/PDF/2008-09%20CBSA9c29e699-00f6-48ba-98a96456c9b98957.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2009).

38. Kitchin, supra note 29.
39.

Id.

40. Id. at 71–72.
41.

Id. at 72. “A member conference is a group of colleges and/or universities that conducts competition
among its members and determines a conference champion in one or more sports . . . .” NCAA Const.
art. 3.02.3.3, reprinted in Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2008–09 NCAA Manual (2008) at 7
[hereinafter NCAA Manual]. Conference and NCAA membership is available to colleges and
universities that are accredited and located in the United States. Id. art. 3.1.1, reprinted in NCAA
Manual, at 8.

42.

Heller, supra note 3, at 299–300.

43.

Kitchin, supra note 29, at 72 (quoting NCAA Const. art. 1.3, reprinted in NCAA Manual, supra note
41, at 1).

44. See Marsh & Robbins, supra note 1, at 703–04.
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Instead, the goal is cooperation between the school and the NCAA to ensure that
member institutions are abiding by the voluntarily agreed-upon rules.45 The NCAA
adopted rules regulating recruiting, eligibility, amateurism, and financial aid in
1948.46 In 1950, policies to enforce the rules were developed because it became clear
that rules without means of enforcement would be largely ineffective.47 The
Committee on Infractions (“COI”) acts as the judge and jury in a trial, and the
enforcement staff investigates allegations and prosecutes the case when there is a
hearing.48 “The enforcement staff investigates and pursues alleged rule violations
while the COI resolves issues of fact that pertain to alleged violations, determines
when a violation has occurred, and imposes the penalties.”49 The enforcement staff
gives notice to member institutions of possible violations.50 The enforcement staff
and the member school then begin a cooperative effort to gather facts.51 Finally, the
COI resolves issues of fact and institutes penalties as necessary.52
The first step in the enforcement process is for an NCAA enforcement staff
member to receive informational tips, from a variety of sources, that suggest a school
has violated an NCAA or conference rule or regulation.53 The staff member must
then determine the reliability of the information.54 Whether such information is
reliable is within the discretion of the enforcement staff member.55 If the information
leads the staff member to reasonably believe that the school has committed a violation,
the staff member either dismisses the matter or it is assigned to an enforcement
representative for investigation.56 If warranted, the COI issues a Notice of Inquiry to
the chief executive officer of the school (often the president), stating that the
enforcement staff will begin an investigation.57 The Notice provides, inter alia, details
of the sport involved, the time period under investigation, the identity of those

45.

Id.

46. Kitchin, supra note 29, at 72. Amateurism promotes athletics in a nonprofessional (unpaid) setting

where athletics is a part of the student-athlete’s education. James Hopkins, NCAA Penalties: Corporate
Accountability for Coaches and Presidents, 1 Depaul J. Sports L. & Contemp. Probs. 179, 180 (2003).

47.

Kitchin, supra note 29, at 72.

48. Mike Rogers & Rory Ryan, Navigating the Bylaw Maze in NCAA Major-Infractions Cases, 37 Seton

Hall L. Rev. 749, 753 (2007).

49. Id. at 754.
50. Id. at 764–65.
51.

Id. at 758–60.

52.

Id. at 754.

53.

Heller, supra note 3, at 301.

54. Id. at 301–02.
55.

Id. at 302.

56. Id. at 302–03.
57.

Rogers & Ryan, supra note 48, at 764–65.
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involved, and a statement that the school may obtain legal counsel to represent it
throughout the process and is obliged to cooperate with the investigation.58
At this point, the school may decide to let the COI enforcement staff investigate
violations, hire its own independent investigator, or investigate internally.59 During
the investigation, and later at the hearing, those being interviewed have no right to
remain silent, but in fact have an affirmative duty to cooperate and disclose any
incriminating information.60 This is clearly very different from a civil or criminal
trial where lawyers advise their clients not to volunteer any incriminating information
to the opposing party.61 However, the NCAA’s duty to disclose ensures consideration
of all relevant information by the enforcement staff, and later by the COI.
After the investigation, the COI determines whether to file formal charges in
the form of a Notice of Allegations, or to drop unsubstantiated charges.62 After a
Notice of Allegations is filed, there may or may not be a hearing to determine the
existence of alleged violations and impose penalties, if warranted. 63 Individuals
involved in the hearing have the right to an attorney.64 However, the hearing differs
from a civil or criminal trial in several respects. Most notably, there are almost no
evidentiary rules at the hearing.65 The guidelines state that “all credible, persuasive
evidence of the kind that a reasonably prudent person relies on when conducting an
investigation may be admitted.”66 After the hearing, the COI determines what
penalties will be imposed on the organization.67 Possible penalties include fines,
sanctions that impose limits on recruiting and scholarships, forfeiture of wins, public
censure, and prohibition on post-season competition.68
The goal for NCAA member institutions during the course of an investigation is
to show that they have maintained institutional control over employees, boosters,
and staff.69 One of the worst discoveries during an investigation is a lack of
institutional control because this is indicative of an institution-wide failure, as
58. Id. at 765.
59.

Id. at 778.

60. Id. at 757–58.
61.

Id. at 758.

62. Id. at 766.
63. Id. at 771.
64. Kitchin, supra note 29, at 73.
65.

Heller, supra note 3, at 308.

66. Rogers & Ryan, supra note 48, at 792–93 (quoting NCAA Bylaw 32.8.8.2, reprinted in NCAA Manual,

supra note 41, at 403).

67.

Id.

68. See NCAA Bylaw 19.5, reprinted in NCAA Manual, supra note 41, at 298. For a discussion on recent

examples of NCAA enforcement decisions, see Heller, supra note 3, at 309–10.

69. See Marsh & Robbins, supra note 1, at 671. A booster is an individual or organization that represents the

institution’s athletic interests by promoting the organization or donating money. NCAA Bylaw 13.02.13,
reprinted in NCAA Manual, supra note 41, at 80.
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opposed to an act committed by one dishonest coach or booster.70 A finding of such
failure is particularly troubling because it suggests a “climate of noncompliance . . .
[with] NCAA rules,” 71 similar to a corporation that violates corporate law where
there is “contempt for rules, negligent disregard of rules, or ignorance of rules.” 72
While the CEO of a school has ultimate responsibility for the conduct of
employees and boosters, compliance directors must also demonstrate institutional
control and compliance with the departmental rules.73 The compliance director’s job
is to keep the school in compliance with NCAA, conference, and internal school
rules and regulations. Originally, athletic departments assigned NCAA-compliance
matters and rules education to former coaches or to individuals who simultaneously
held another job, such as sports marketing.74 Today, the job is considered vital within
an athletic department because the compliance director is the go-to person on rules
and regulations.75 While some schools employ attorneys in this role, there is no
NCAA requirement that the compliance director be an attorney.
III.	PROBLEM

A. New York UPL Statutes in Action
It is a crime in New York State for:

[A]ny natural person to practice or appear as an attorney-at-law . . . for a
person other than himself in a court of record in [New York] [S]tate . . . to
render legal services . . . without having first been duly and regularly licensed
and admitted to practice law in the courts of record of this state, and without
having taken the constitutional oath.76

Although courts have recognized that “legal services” are hard to define, since the
early 1900s they have repeatedly emphasized that such services include drawing up
agreements, preparing legal contracts, and generally giving advice to clients and
taking action for them in matters connected with the law.77 More recently, courts
have reaffirmed that the practice of law includes not only appearing in court, but also
preparing legal instruments of all kinds and giving legal advice.78
Courts are generally even-handed in their punishment for engaging in
unauthorized practices of law, finding laypeople, as well as lawyers practicing outside
70. Id. at 670–71.
71.

Id. at 671.

72. Id.
73. See id. at 670–73.
74.

Id. at 695.

75. Heller, supra note 3, at 317–18.
76. N.Y. Jud. Ct. Acts Law § 478 (McKinney 2008).
77.

See, e.g., Alfani, 227 N.Y. at 338–39.

78. See Spivak v. Sachs, 16 N.Y.2d 163 (1965); In re Rosenberg, 661 N.Y.S.2d 888 (3d Dep’t 1997); In re

Perez, 327 B.R. 94.
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their jurisdiction, to be guilty.79 In Spivak v. Sachs, the New York Court of Appeals
found the plaintiff, a licensed attorney in California, guilty of violating section 270
of the New York Penal Law80 for the unauthorized practice of law.81 In that case, a
California lawyer came to New York on a single occasion to advise a client about
obtaining a divorce in New York and gave his opinion as to New York law concerning
alimony and custody issues.82 The court held that although the attorney was licensed
to practice in California and only gave advice as to New York law in one instance, he
still violated section 270 because he was not licensed to practice in New York.83 The
Spivak court explained the policy concerns behind UPL that supported their decision,
namely that we have UPL statutes in order to “protect our citizens against the dangers
of legal representation and advice given by persons not trained, examined and licensed
for such work, whether they be laymen or lawyers from other jurisdictions.”84
In addition to prosecuting attorneys who offer one-time legal advice on other
states’ law, New York also punishes attorneys in the state who advise on and practice
the law of other countries.85 In In re Roel, the New York Court of Appeals enjoined
Lorenzo Roel from practicing law in any manner whatsoever.86 Roel was a Mexican
citizen and an attorney admitted to practice in the courts of Mexico, but was not a
United States citizen or a member of the New York bar association.87 While in New
York, Roel gave legal advice and services for issues that came under Mexican law,
including Mexican divorce law.88 He drafted documents that were necessary to
commence divorce proceedings under Mexican law and sent the documents to a
colleague in Mexico who represented his clients in the actual proceedings.89 Although
he had an office in New York, he did not give any advice on New York law.90
Furthermore, in his retainer agreement used in divorce actions, his client agreed that
Roel did not represent that divorce decrees would be legal or valid outside Mexico,
and the client represented that he has consulted a United States attorney in his own
state.91 The court ruled that Roel was practicing law in violation of section 270 of the
Penal Law because of the nature of the activities performed, not the jurisdiction of the
79. See Alfani, 227 N.Y. at 335, 341; Spivak, 16 N.Y.2d at 165–68.
80. The relevant law is now § 478.
81.

Spivak, 16 N.Y.2d at 165.

82. Id. at 166.
83. Id. at 167–68.
84. Id. at 168.
85. See In re Roel, 3 N.Y.2d 224, 227–29 (1957).
86. Id. at 227.
87.

Id.

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 228.
91.

Id.
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law that he practiced.92 In its decision, the Roel court reiterated the policy concerns
behind UPL statutes:
While it is true that he renders only specialized services dealing with a field in
which he claims to be particularly competent, the competence of [Roel] in the
practice of his specialty is not dispositive of the case before us. In many fields
of endeavor laymen acquire specialized knowledge which is relevant to the
practice of law in that area. Thus accountants may know a great deal about tax
law and labor relations consultants much about labor law. A specialized area of
competence does not, however, entitle these laymen to engage in the business
of giving legal advice based on their knowledge of the subjects.93

B.	Based on Case Law and Policy Concerns, Athletic Compliance Directors Are
Routinely Practicing Law

Based on New York’s definition of unauthorized practice of the law, athletic
compliance directors in New York schools are violating section 478 of the Judiciary
Law and should be prosecuted. It is curious that a system that strenuously prosecutes
other cases violating UPL largely ignores UPL violations occurring at colleges and
universities throughout the state and country. Non-lawyers negotiating deals, drafting
contracts and regulations, and interpreting agreements when they have no minimum
level of training or education requirement, are potentially detrimental to athletes and
their organizations.94
An important responsibility of the compliance director is to develop written
guidelines for investigating and reporting NCAA infractions.95 Accordingly, he is
responsible for making sure that coaches and athletic directors observe the guidelines
by analyzing the rules, and explaining legislation and rule changes as they occur.96
Additionally, the compliance director assists coaches and staff with the day-to-day
interpretation of NCAA, conference, and school rules.97 Often, the coach will go to
the compliance director with a question about a given course of action, and it is up to
the director to investigate the issue, analyze the regulations, and inform the coach
whether such action would violate a rule.98 The compliance director must also set up
a monitoring system in order to prevent recruiting, financial aid, and eligibility
violations as well as academic fraud, and must educate student athletes about NCAA
92.

Id. at 228–29.

93.

Id. at 231.

94. This argument was originally used to push for stronger regulation of professional sports agents. See

David S. Caudill, Revisiting the Ethics of Representing Professional Athletes: Agents, “Attorney-Agents,” FullService Agencies, and the Dream Team Model, 3 Va. Sports & Ent. L.J. 31, 37–39 (2003).

95. Marsh & Robbins, supra note 1, at 697.
96. See id.
97.

Id.

98. Id.
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rules.99 If a compliance director suspects or uncovers a violation in the course of his
work, it is his duty to report the violation to the NCAA.100 The duties of compliance
directors are comparable to the practices of the attorneys in Spivak and Roel that
were found to be in violation of UPL statutes.101 Like those attorneys, compliance
directors advise clients by interpreting regulations and advise coaches and staff how
to obey NCAA guidelines.102 Like the attorneys in those UPL cases, the fact that
non-lawyer compliance directors are knowledgeable of sports law or NCAA rules
should not give them any right to provide legal services with respect to the same.
Such a “specialized area of competence” does not entitle laymen to give legal advice
to clients in divorce and other proceedings,103 and this prohibition should extend to
athletic compliance directors. Based on the courts’ reasoning in these cases, athletic
compliance directors are practicing law.
Beyond case law suggesting that violations of UPL statutes are present, the nature
of the regulations themselves suggests that compliance directors are violating UPL
statutes. The NCAA Manual is over four hundred pages, containing the constitution
and bylaws.104 It also includes detailed rules, regulations, and punishments for a
variety of infractions.105 Guidelines include rules governing recruiting, sponsorship,
academics, and gift-giving.106 Articles one through six of the constitution consist of
information relevant to the purposes of the NCAA, its structure, membership and
legislative process information, and important principles for the conduct of
intercollegiate athletics.107 Articles ten through twenty-three are the operating
bylaws, consisting of legislation adopted by members to promote the principles
enunciated in the constitution and to achieve the Association’s purpose.108 Articles
thirty through thirty-three are administrative bylaws that set forth policies and
procedures for the implementation of (a) general legislative actions of the Association;
(b) the NCAA championships and business of the Association; (c) the Association’s
enforcement program; and (d) the Association’s athletics certification program.109
These administrative bylaws may be adopted or modified by the Division I Board of
Directors or Legislative Council for the “efficient administration of the activities

99. See id. at 695, 698.
100. Id. at 697.
101. See generally Spivak, 16 N.Y.2d at 167–68; In re Roel, 3 N.Y.2d at 231.
102. Marsh & Robbins, supra note 1, at 697.
103. In re Roel, 3 N.Y.2d at 231.
104. See NCAA Manual, supra note 41.
105. See generally id. The NCAA Manual contains legislation adopted by the specific division. Id.
106. See generally id.
107. NCAA Const., reprinted in NCAA Manual, supra note 41, at viii.
108. NCAA Bylaws, reprinted in NCAA Manual, supra note 41, at viii.
109. NCAA Admin. Bylaws, reprinted in NCAA Manual, supra note 41, at viii.
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that they govern.”110 The member schools may also amend bylaws through the
NCAA legislative process at the annual meeting.111
The NCAA laws are complex. Indeed, experienced coaches and sports law
scholars have lamented the difficulty of understanding these rules and called for
reforms to the rules.112 The NCAA debated an average of 140 new rules during its
last three annual conventions.113 In 1952 the NCAA Manual was a twenty-five-page
brochure; it now contains 412 pages.114 Legendary Penn State football coach Joe
Paterno explained, “we change the rules so much, we don’t give people a chance to
adjust. Maybe instead of those 30-second TV spots they do on each college during
televised football and basketball games saying how great we are, they could have a
spot on the rules.”115 A former University of Texas basketball coach concurred with
this sentiment when he stated, “[y]ou’ve got to be a lawyer at the top of your class to
understand the NCAA rules.”116
The victims of rule violation cases are the student-athletes who are deemed
ineligible to compete in their sport. For many young people who earn athletic
scholarships, the award money is the only way they can afford a college education.117
Student athletes who lose their eligibility are not only denied a chance to compete in
high-level athletics, but are deprived of their only opportunity to attend college to
improve their lives.118 Because students do not have due process rights in the NCAA
enforcement process, it is all the more imperative that athletic compliance directors
are competent in interpreting NCAA regulations so that students are not deemed
ineligible due to actions beyond their control.119
Although there are no cases discussing whether a compliance director is engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law, this type of rule interpretation and advising is
considered unauthorized practice of law in other areas.120 For example, informing
clients about the benefits and disadvantages of contracts, and the consequences of

110. Id.
111. See id.
112. See, e.g., Broyles, supra note 2, at 509 n.155–56; see Brent Shrotenbroer, NCAA Rules Are Too Complex,

Bend Wkly., Feb. 29, 2008, http://www.bendweekly.com/news/14171.html.

113. Id. at 509 n.154.
114. Id. See generally NCAA Manual, supra note 41.
115. Broyles, supra note 2, at 509 n.154 (quoting Don Yaeger, Undue Process: The NCAA’s Injustice

for All 93 (1991)) (alteration omitted).

116. Id. at 509 (quoting Yaeger, supra note 116, at 93) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
117. Broyles, supra note 2, at 527–28.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 534. It has been argued that the NCAA should revise its procedures to protect the due process

rights of coaches and athletes. See id. at 546–48.

120. See, e.g., In re Roel, 3 N.Y.2d at 228–30; Alfani, 227 N.Y. at 335–36; Spivak, 16 N.Y.2d at 165.
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taking certain action is deemed practicing law.121 Some jurisdictions have determined
that reviewing, critiquing, and advising others of the legal consequences of documents
is considered the practice of law.122 In fact, some courts have found that “simply
filling in blank spaces on standardized forms drafted by attorneys can be considered
practicing law if doing so requires legal judgment.”123 Because these seemingly
innocuous practices have been deemed violations of UPL statutes, it is troubling that
New York has not seen the need to regulate the conduct of athletic compliance
directors who do significantly more legal work. In Roel and Spivak, the court found
that attorneys licensed to practice in other states or countries who gave legal advice
in New York were engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.124 The potential
consequences in those cases were arguably far less serious than the potential
consequences of athletic compliance directors practicing law. In both Roel and Spivak,
the individuals at issue were licensed attorneys who would have been trained in legal
analysis and reasoning.125 In contrast, athletic compliance directors have no
educational requirements or professional oversight, so their conduct in the legal realm
is much more problematic. Although there is a lack of case law on this specific issue,
athletic compliance directors are practicing law without any authorization.
IV. ANALYSIS/SOLUTION

Athletic compliance directors must be regulated so that the legal profession and
the NCAA can be sure that individuals performing legally related duties are
competent and trained. There are multiple ways to achieve this goal. Ideally, states
would amend their UPL statutes to include this type of work in the definition of
practicing law and would prosecute unlicensed practitioners. Another possible
solution would be for states to apply an attorney’s standard of care to those who
continue to work as compliance directors without a law degree. However, the most
practical solution would be for the NCAA itself to revise its regulations and require
compliance directors to be licensed attorneys. In addition, the NCAA and member
conferences could take cues from the sports agent industry, discussed infra, which is
generally regulated by individual sports leagues.
Examining each alternative in turn, state UPL statutes should be amended to
include athletic compliance work. This would serve the dual interests of the NCAA,
which wants rule compliance,126 and the legal profession, which has a strong interest
in regulating the profession and ensuring that only duly-licensed attorneys are
121. Caudill, supra note 94, at 39 (quoting Francorp, Inc. v. Seibert, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1057 (N.D. Ill.

2002)).

122. Id.
123. Id. (quoting Francorp, 211 F. Supp. 2d. at 1056).
124. See In re Roel, 3 N.Y.2d 224; Spivak, 16 N.Y.2d 163.
125. In re Roel, 3 N.Y.2d at 228; Spivak, 16 N.Y.2d at 165.
126. Kitchin, supra note 29, at 72.
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practicing law.127 For example, New York’s law could include a provision that specifies
that persons who interpret and advise others on the legal consequences of violating
administrative regulations are in violation of UPL statutes. However, defining and
regulating the practice of law is usually a power of a state’s judiciary branch.128 As a
result, attempts by the legislature to enhance the regulatory scheme “are often resisted
by the very courts they are intended to assist.”129
For example, Washington State attempted to limit its definition of practicing law
by passing a statute that authorized non-lawyer escrow agents and officers to “select,
prepare, and complete documents and instruments relating to . . . loan . . . or extension
of credit, sale, or transfer of real or personal property.”130 In Bennion, Van Camp,
Hagan & Ruhl v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., the Supreme Court of Washington ruled that
the statute was invalid because it “redefined the practice of law by exempting conduct
previously reserved for attorneys.”131 The court reiterated the policy behind UPL
statutes when it held that “[i]t is the duty of the court to protect the public from the
activity of those who, because of lack of professional skills, may cause injury whether
they are members of the bar or persons never qualified for or admitted to the bar.”132
The court also warned that “there is no such thing as a simple legal instrument in the
hands of a layman.”133
Whereas the petitioner in Bennion requested that the court restrict the practice of
law so that non-lawyers could perform legal services without fear of prosecution,134
legislators who propose amending UPL statutes would be trying to expand the
definition of the legal practice by including athletic compliance conduct, so that nonlawyers who interpret NCAA regulations and give advice on such regulations would
fall within and violate the statute. This would further the legal profession’s goal of
protecting the public from unqualified individuals performing legal services.135 It
would also protect student-athletes from being victimized by the actions of compliance
directors who are not bound by ethical or professional standards.
If legislators find it untenable to amend UPL statutes due to resistance from the
courts, another way to regulate the conduct of compliance directors is to impose an
127. See Buhai, supra note 6.
128. Id. at 95.
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing Bennion, Van Camp, Hagan & Ruhl v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 635 P.2d 730, 732 (Wash.

1981)). Bennion held that section 19.62 of the Washington Revised Code violated article 4, section 1 of
the Washington Constitution, wherein the state supreme court was given the exclusive power to regulate
the practice of law. Bennion, 635 P.2d at 731. The law limited escrow agents’ authority to execute “deeds,
promissory notes, deeds of trusts, mortgages, security agreements, assignments, releases, satisfactions,
reconveyances, contracts for sale or purchase of real or personal property, and bills of sale.” Id. at 732.

131. Id. at 735.
132. Id. at 733 (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. Id.
135. See Buhai, supra note 6, at 87–88.
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attorney’s standard of care on all compliance directors, regardless of whether they are
attorneys.136 A majority of courts have held, “if a layman undertakes to exercise
discretion in the devising of the form of substance of a legal transaction, he properly
should be held to the standards of a lawyer. . . . The violation . . . of this standard of
care [is] . . . negligence for which [the layman] is liable.”137 It could be argued that
this standard should apply to all sports agents who arguably are engaged in the
practice of law in order to level the playing field between attorney-agents and nonattorney-agents.138 Under this standard, both attorney-agents and non-attorney-agents
“would be held to the standard of care of practicing attorneys, and would therefore
be governed by applicable ethical rules.”139 Similarly, athletic compliance officers are
often engaged in negotiations and interpretations of rules that affect the rights of the
school as well as the athletes.140 Indeed, the ramifications of such negotiations and
interpretations on college athletes could be more profound than in the professional
sports context, since athletes deemed ineligible due to NCAA rules violations face
the end of their collegiate sports career, and often their college education because
scholarships are revoked when member institutions violate rules.141
It is possible that states and bar associations have not seen fit to regulate this
industry because they assume the NCAA is regulating it.142 However, although the
NCAA is currently considered a private actor, it is possible that courts may revisit
this conclusion and find that, like high school athletic associations, the NCAA is a
state actor and is thus subject to state UPL statutes.143
In NCAA v. Tarkanian, the Supreme Court overruled twenty years of precedent,
finding the NCAA did not qualify as a state actor—a decision that has been criticized
since it was decided in 1988.144 Since the 1960s, courts had held that high school
136. Cf. id. at 128 (discussing sports agents, arguing that “[h]olding attorney-agents and layperson agents to

the same standard of care would ensure that everyone competes on the same ethical grounds”).

137. Anderson v. Nw. Bonded Escrows, Inc., 484 P.2d 488, 491 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
138. See Buhai supra note 6, at 128.
139. Id. at 128.
140. See generally Heller, supra note 3.
141. Broyles, supra note 2, at 526–28.
142. Cf. id. at 558–59. In NCAA v. Tarkanian, the Supreme Court heard Tarkanian’s argument that action by

the NCAA was state action, “thus making schools liable for violations of Due Process under the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 559. The Court, “viewing the relevant ‘action’ as the adoption of the
NCAA legislation by the full membership rather than the university’s deferral to that legislation, found
‘[i]t would be more appropriate to conclude that [the University of Nevada, Las Vegas] has conducted its
athletic program under color of the policies adopted by the NCAA, rather than that those policies were
developed and enforced under color of Nevada law.’” Id. (quoting NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179,
199 (1988)).

143. See generally Kadence A. Otto & Kristal S. Stippich, Revisiting Tarkanian: The Entwinement and

Interdependence of the NCAA and State Universities and Colleges 20 Years Later, 18 J. Legal Aspects of
Sport 243 (2008) (arguing that the NCAA is a state actor, like high school athletic associations, and
subject to regulations).

144. Id. at 243–44.
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athletic associations are state actors and, until Tarkanian, most courts found the
NCAA was a state actor.145 The courts in these cases reasoned that the state entity
(the school) uses a private organization (the athletic association) to accomplish an
essential part of its mission.146 “A state could not avoid constitutional restrictions by
giving a private association authority over athletics.”147 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit
found that public high schools were “deeply involved in fielding and promoting
athletic teams with expenditures of tremendous time, energy, and resources including
financing, training teams, and paying the coaches.”148 The fact that private schools
were part of the athletic association did not change the result. Instead, the schools
that chose to join the association would also be subject to the restrictions of the
Fourteenth Amendment.149 This logic was extended to the NCAA, as one district
court reasoned that “the high school athletic association’s activities, . . . control, and
regulation of its members were ‘remarkably similar to’ the NCAA activities.”150 The
Fifth Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that “[o]rganized athletics play a large role in
higher education, and . . . meaningful regulation of this aspect of education is now
beyond the effective reach of any one state.”151
However, the courts began to reverse course and find that the NCAA was not a
state actor, culminating with Tarkanian.152 There, the Supreme Court reasoned that
although the State of Nevada helped in some small way to create the NCAA rules
(through the University of Nevada, Las Vegas’s role), the state was not the “source of
legislation adopted by the NCAA.”153 The Court rejected Tarkanian’s argument that
the University of Nevada, Las Vegas had “no practical alternative but to comply”
with NCAA rules “since the NCAA’s power was so great,” because there were
alternatives: The school could have refused to obey the rules and face possible
145. Id. at 250–54.
146. Id. at 249.
147. Id. at 251.
148. Id. at 250–51 (quoting La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. St. Augustine High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 396

F.2d 224, 228 (5th Cir. 1968)).

149. Id. at 251 (citing La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 396 F.2d at 228). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “[n]o

State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 establishes a cause of action when the
government violates a citizen’s Constitutional rights under “color of state law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2008).
“The ‘state action’ requirement provides that a private entity is subject to the Fourteenth Amendment
under section 1983 only if its action is ‘fairly attributable’ to the state.” Otto & Stippich supra note 143,
at 243 n.2.

150. Otto & Stippich, supra note 143, at 252 (citing Parish v. NCAA, 361 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D. La. 1973),

aff ’d, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975)).

151. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1032.
152. Otto & Stippich, supra note 143, at 259–60. Beginning in 1984, lower federal courts began to hold that

the NCAA was not a state actor on the theory that the Supreme Court in Blum v. Yaretsky “rejected the
‘indirect involvement of state governments’ theory” that had been previously relied upon. Id. at 259; see
Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).

153. Otto & Stippich, supra note 143, at 265 (quoting Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193).
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disciplinary action, or alternatively, the school could discontinue its membership in
the NCAA.154
In contrast, in the high school athletics context, the Supreme Court has declined
to apply Tarkanian. In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Schools Athletic
Association, the Supreme Court held that a high school athletic association was a state
actor when the association enforced its rules against a member school because there
was “pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials” in the
association’s composition.155 The Court found that Tarkanian was not controlling
because the schools that were members of the association at issue were located in the
same state, while NCAA member schools are in various states.156 The fact that the
schools were located in the same state was dispositive for the Court in determining
state action.157 Notably, the Court declined to elaborate on this crucial factor, even
though college and high school athletic associations are nearly indistinguishable in
terms of purpose, structure, and organization.158 Due to these similarities, it is clear
that the logic used in Brentwood could and should be extended to the NCAA state
action cases. Public schools predominately govern the NCAA, generate the most
revenue for the organization, and carry out most of the enforcement of NCAA rules
using state resources.159 The issue of whether the NCAA is a state actor may come
before the Supreme Court again.160 In 2007, the Second Circuit held in Cohane v.
NCAA that the NCAA “could be deemed a state actor if the allegations in a coach’s
complaint were proven.”161 Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari,162 it is
likely that this issue may resurface in the near future.163
In other contexts, states have promulgated laws to regulate private industries. For
example, Congress adopted the Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines,
which regulate employee conduct, and issued a list of possible sentences and penalties
for corporations found guilty of federal crimes.164 Under these guidelines, “an effective
program to prevent and detect violations of the law substantially mitigates the
154. Id. at 266.
155. Id. at 270 (quoting Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 298

(2001)).

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 273 (“[T]he Court did not expound upon why the fact that all public schools were located in one

state as opposed to many states should be determinative in light of all of the other similarities between
high school and collegiate athletic associations.”).

159. See id. at 279–87.
160. Id. at 244.
161. Id. at 244–45. The coach’s complaint alleged that a “state university colluded with and effected the

resignation of a coach in order to ‘placate the NCAA.’” Id. (citing Cohane v. NCAA, 215 F. App’x 13,
15 (2d Cir. 2007), cert denied, 128 S. Ct. 641 (2007)).

162. Cohane, 215 F. App’x 13.
163. Otto & Stippich, supra note 143, at 244.
164. Rostain, supra note 16, at 1402.
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penalties imposed on companies convicted of a crime.”165 A compliance program
should set forth compliance protocols and benchmarks, designate compliance
personnel, distribute resources as needed, and discipline rule-breakers.166 Since the
1990s, compliance professionals have developed businesses that cater to various types
of organizations and industries.167 Many of the concerns that exist in regulating
corporations also exist in regulating the NCAA and should prompt states to regulate
athletic compliance directors.168
Perhaps the most practical solution would be for the NCAA to amend its own
rules and require athletic compliance directors to be licensed attorneys. While it is
true that the NCAA has its own rules of conduct contained in the NCAA Manual,
it does not indicate the type of training needed to perform the job of a compliance
director.169 The NCAA constitution makes clear that it is the responsibility of each
member institution to control its intercollegiate athletic program in compliance with
the rules and regulations of the Association.170 While it specifies that the president
or chancellor of the university is ultimately responsible for the administration of all
aspects of the athletics program, by all accounts171 it is the athletic compliance
director who is in charge of maintaining rule-compliance.172 In order to ensure that
165. Id. (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted).
166. Id.
167. Id. Traditionally, clients benefited from hiring a lawyer to conduct internal investigations because the

corporation would be protected by the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 1412. Under this privilege,
corporate clients’ communications with counsel “made for the purpose of obtaining or giving legal
advice” were not discoverable. Id. Under the Upjohn rule, any communication between employees of a
company and an attorney for the purpose of receiving legal advice is covered by the attorney-client
privilege, not just those communications between attorneys and high-level management. See Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); see also Rostain, supra note 16, at 1413. Today, the attorneyclient privilege is not considered as beneficial or essential to corporations in the midst of an investigation.
Corporations are pressured to waive attorney-client privilege during an investigation because the
corporation’s willingness to waive the privilege is a factor in determining charges and punishments.
Rostain, supra note 16, at 1415. The Securities and Exchange Commission, Department of Justice, and
the Environmental Protection Agency have all stated that they “would consider a company’s waiver of
the attorney-client privilege . . . in connection with internal reviews” when deciding whether to enforce
rule violations the company may have committed. Id. at 1416.

168. Like internal corporate investigations, an NCAA internal investigation conducted by a university that

learns of a violation can mitigate its punishment at the penalty stage of an investigation. Rogers &
Ryan, supra note 48, at 778. Schools and corporations have similar concerns when deciding whether
they should use in-house staff to conduct an investigation or hire outside investigators. Id. Both
organizations are concerned about public perception of an internal investigation. Id. The public and
media are often skeptical of a completely internal investigation because of the belief that internal people
cannot be completely objective. Id. at 779. In addition, there is always a chance that the investigation is
a sham designed to placate the public, government, or NCAA, and is not a thorough investigation
aimed at uncovering any real violations. Id.

169. See generally NCAA Manual, supra note 41, at 43–45.
170. NCAA Const. art. 2, reprinted in NCAA Manual, supra note 41, at 3.
171. Id.
172. See Marsh & Robbins, supra note 1, at 695.
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NCAA regulations are followed, the rules should be amended to include a provision
specifying who is qualified to be a compliance director. The rules should stipulate
that based on their daily tasks of interpreting rules and advising coaches and
administrators, compliance directors are required to be attorneys. The regulation
should explain that, given the educational requirements needed to become a lawyer,
as well as the training in negotiating, drafting contracts, and interpreting statutes,
attorneys are most qualified to perform this job.173 Because attorneys are bound by a
strict ethics code, there is an added incentive for the NCAA to adopt this
amendment.174 This would reassure the Association that the individuals hired as
gatekeepers and enforcers of the rules will not treat rule violations with kid gloves, or
turn a blind eye, because they are bound by duty both to the NCAA and to bar
associations.
The NCAA should look to sports agency regulations for assistance in drafting its
regulations. Recognizing that this profession has been described as “one of the most
deceptive and unethical aspects of the sports industry,” 175 various states have
implemented regulations to restrict some forms of agent conduct.176 In addition to
those regulations, various professional sports leagues have developed their own method
of regulation.177 The first professional sports association that created a program to
certify and regulate sports agents was the National Football League Players Association
(“NFLPA”), which was founded in 1983.178 Under its guidelines, “any individual
desiring to represent NFL players must be certified as an NFLPA Contract Advisor,
and must comply with the NFLPA Regulations Governing Contract Advisors.”179 In
order to receive NFLPA certification, a potential sports agent is required to file an
Application for Certification as an NFLPA Contract Advisor.180
When completing the NFLPA Application, an applicant must state his
educational background, his bar admissions or professional licenses, his
employment history for the past five years and his experience representing
professional athletes. Each applicant must provide names of professional and
financial references and must state whether he is bonded if he intends to
handle players’ funds. He must also disclose whether he has been disbarred,
173. Cf. Caudill, supra note 94, at 38–40.
174. See Denckla, supra note 4, at 2593.
175. Buhai, supra note 6, at 126 (quoting Ethan Lock, The Regulatory Scheme for Player Representatives in the

National Football League: The Real Power of Jerry Maguire, 35 Am. Bus. L.J. 319, 319 (1998)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

176. Id. at 126–27. “In addition, the American Bar Association has also recommended that an attorney

engaging in a second occupation that involves some practice of law should be held to the standards of
the bar for this occupation as well.” Id. at 127.

177. See Gary P. Konn, Sports Agents Representing Professional Athletes: Being Certified Means Never Having to

Say You’re Qualified, 7 Ent. & Sports Law. 1, 7 (1988).

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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suspended or otherwise disciplined as a member of a profession, convicted of
criminal charges, suspended or expelled from an educational institution, or
involved as a defendant in a civil action.181

The NFLPA regulations further require that a Contract Advisor must disclose all
relevant qualifications, engage in continuous education on, inter alia, league structure
and governance, negotiating techniques, new trends and changes in sports law, and
“must attend an annual NFLPA briefing on contract negotiating.”182 Other professional
organizations, such as the Major League Baseball Players Association, National
Hockey League Players Associations, and National Basketball League Players
Association have similar requirements.183 Additionally, due to violations occurring after
those regulations were adopted, states began subjecting agents to their own internal
regulations.184 Furthermore, Congress passed the Uniform Athlete Agents Act in
2000, a model law that may be adopted by states.185 The Act standardizes agent
requirements for reporting, registration and record keeping, and also allows offenders
to be punished criminally.186 It would be beneficial to institutions and bar associations
to have the NCAA and individual conferences adopt similar requirements for
compliance directors at universities, whereby they must detail their qualifications and
certifications and become subject to penalties for violations.
From a policy perspective, leaving the industry unregulated is unwise. “A
compliance director in a major program is an educator, arbitrator, mediator, advocate,
enforcer, and often the fall-guy when the school violates NCAA rules.”187 Because
NCAA violations can result in devastating scandals for athletic departments in
particular, and schools in general,188 it is in the schools’ own self-interest to employ
lawyers who are likely more skilled at interpreting NCAA regulations.
Furthermore, a lawyer’s training makes him especially suited for compliance
work, even though the NCAA investigation process is designed to be cooperative,
not adversarial.189 Although lawyers are taught to be advocates for their client when
working in the adversarial system in civil and criminal litigation, they also have the

181. Id.
182. Id. at 8.
183. Id. at 8–11.
184. Jeremy J. Geisel, Disbarring Jerry Maguire: How Broadly Defining “Unauthorized Practice of Law” Could

Take the “Lawyer” Out of “Lawyer-Agent” Despite the Current State of Athlete Agent Legislation, 18 Marq.
Sports L. Rev. 225, 233 (2007).

185. Id. at 234; see 15 U.S.C. § 7807; Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Unif. Athletes

Agents Act (2000).

186. Id.
187. Marsh & Robbins, supra note 1, at 695.
188. Heller, supra note 3, at 295.
189. See Rogers & Ryan, supra note 48, at 760.
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opportunity to develop negotiating skills in settlements and arbitration.190 Beyond
this, employing an attorney as the compliance director is useful because NCAA
investigations sometimes become adversarial when the investigation results in a
disagreement about findings.191 When this occurs, the attorney’s expertise would be
valuable because he can go into “trial mode” at a hearing before the COI to dispute
facts with the enforcement staff.192 Although a director with a sports management or
other masters degree may understand the workings of the NCAA investigation
process, an attorney will be more skilled at fact-finding and interpreting regulations
and legislation.193
V. CONCLUSION

Compliance directors play a vital role in a university’s athletic department,
guaranteeing that the school is complying with NCAA rules and regulations. As a
member institution, the school has agreed to comply with these rules, and it is up to
the compliance director to ensure that the school does so. Because compliance directors
interpret legislation and give advice with legal consequences, they are engaged in the
practice of law. Thus, those directors who are not attorneys are engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, and it is contrary to the interests of the legal profession to
allow this to continue. In order to promote regulation, state legislatures and the NCAA
should adopt laws and regulations that require these professionals to be attorneys in
order to protect the schools and athletes they represent.

190. Opportunities to develop these skills start as early as law school. See generally New York Law School,

Academics, Lawyering Skills Center Simulation Courses. http://www.nyls.edu/academics/jd_programs/
lawyering_skills_externships/simulations (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).

191. Rogers & Ryan, supra note 48, at 760.
192. Id. When a school voluntarily agrees to become a member of the NCAA, it agrees to abide by all rules

and regulations of the NCAA. See id. at 759. This includes a duty to assist in the investigation process,
regardless of whether the investigation helps or hurts the institution. Id. at 757–58. “[A]n institution
with an incriminating document must disclose it—even if it is not requested—as the Bylaws impose a
continuing duty to self-police and report violations.” Id. at 758. The prosecution in the criminal justice
system has a similar disclosure requirement. Id. at 758–59. Brady v. Maryland requires a prosecutor to
disclose to the defendant “all evidence material to guilt or punishment.” Id. at 758. Because the state and
a prosecutor should be motivated by a sense of justice and “not to obtain a conviction,” this requirement
is both practical and justified. Id. at 758–59. Similarly, the institution’s ultimate interest should be in
embracing and upholding NCAA policies, not wriggling out of a punishment. See id. at 759.

193. See id. at 757–60.
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